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Abstract 
There has been an apparently contradictory trend in the global inequality in living standards over the 
past quarter-century. On the one hand, global inequality between countries has decreased significantly, 
while on the other hand, inequality within many countries has increased, particularly in the developed 
economies. Both of these developments represent an historical shift. 
 
What explains these changes? To a great extent, globalisation is behind both trends. It explains in part 
the extraordinary South-North catch-up process, and the uneven effects of fundamental structural 
change in the economies of both North and South. But other factors are also at play.  
 
This paper examines these various factors, the future developments in inequality in the world and the 
means available to governments to contain national inequalities while still benefitting from the 
potential economic efficiencies of globalisation.  
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In a human society in the process of unification inequality between nations acquires the same 
meaning as inequality among classes in the past. Standards of living differ today between 
continents or between countries more than they ever did. At the same time, the perception of 
inequality increases whereas resignation to poverty and to destiny is disappearing.  
 
Raymond Aron The Dawn of Universal History 
 
 
 
There has been an apparently contradictory evolution in the global inequality in income or living 
standards over the past quarter-century. On the one hand, global inequality between countries has 
decreased significantly, while on the other hand, inequality within many countries has increased, 
particularly in the developed economies. Both of these developments represent an historical shift. 
 
Inequality in the world is believed to have grown continuously since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, when the industrial revolution sparked the economic take-off of those countries we now call 
“developed”. While the rate of increase slowed after World War II, inequality in the world reached a 
level that had probably never been seen inside even the most unequal national community. What we 
see today is a real historical reversal: in 25 years, the global economy has practically wiped out the 
increase in inequality in living standards recorded in the previous 60 years.  
 
Now, the reverse is happening inside nation-states. In the majority of countries, inequality has begun 
to rise after decades of stability. The cases of the US and the UK are well-documented, but we see the 
same phenomenon to varying degrees in Germany, Italy, Canada, even in Sweden, a country 
traditionally strongly economically egalitarian, and more recently if more modestly, in France. 
According to OECD figures, inequality in standards of living increased in more than two-thirds of 
developed countries between 1980 and 2000. Emerging and developing economies are not exempt 
from the trend either: income gaps are exploding in China, India and most other Asian countries. The 
same phenomenon can be seen in several African and Latin American countries, already highly 
unequal.  
 
What explains these changes? To a great extent, globalisation is behind both of these trends. It 
explains in part the extraordinary South-North catch-up process and the uneven effects of fundamental 
structural change in the economies of both North and South. But other factors are also at play.  
 
Economic reforms introduced in China during the 1980s, especially the opening up of the economy to 
foreign investment and later to global markets, launched more than a billion people into an accelerated 
catch-up with the rest of the world. The same thing occurred, though at a slower pace, in India after 
the economic reforms of the early 1990s and the decision to open up what had been a very closed 
economy to international trade. Thus, the living standards of a total of more than two billion people 
began to increase at a pace hitherto unknown, and certainly much more rapidly than in the rich 
countries, precipitating a drop in global inequality. The number of people in the world trying to 
survive on less than one euro per day, after having increased for several centuries, declined by 500 
million in just twenty years. 
 
Of course, there are still far too many poor people in the world (more than one billion), but there are 
fewer and fewer in Asia. The poorest countries today are in Africa and Central Asia. Some are even 
poorer than the Chinese and Indians were 25 years ago, which some suggest means that inequality in 
the world has risen. But the demographic significance of these numbers is too weak to deny the effect 
of the growth of the Asian giants on the decrease in global inequality. Moreover, we can now see the 
spill over effect of the large emerging economies on these poor countries. After fifteen years of 
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stagnation and recession in a great number of African countries, since the turn of the century we have 
been seeing GDP per capita growth of more than three per cent per annum. 
 
The decrease in global inequality is therefore, above all, the result of a decrease in inequality between 
countries, particularly between rich countries and emerging ones and, more recently, practically all 
developing countries. This catch-up process has not even been affected by the latest global economic 
crisis. Growth has slowed, but the difference favouring developing countries remains more or less 
constant. 
 
This global economic reversal has been accompanied by a substantial and unexpected rise in 
inequality within some countries. There is a sense that we are faced with a situation in which the 
reduction in inequality between countries is offset by its increase inside national economies. But 
happily, this match is only partial. The increase in national inequality has so far had little impact on 
inequality between all inhabitants of the planet. Furthermore, while it is tempting to think that the two 
trends are linked, globalisation is not their common and single cause. Certainly, globalisation is 
responsible in part for the catch-up between North and South and can explain the rise in national 
inequalities in both the North and the South. But there are also other factors, of which some are only 
indirectly linked to globalisation and others that are country specific. 
 
As far as the developed countries are concerned, first, it is clear that global trade is responsible for 
profound structural change. The rapid addition of more than half a billion low-skilled Asian workers 
into global productive capacity has resulted in the transfer of some economic activity to the countries 
of the South, a geographic relocation of multinationals and a fragmentation of the chain of operations 
that delivers manufactured goods to end users. In the countries of the North, this has entailed a drop in 
demand for low-skilled labour, the relative wage rates for such labour and the corresponding rate of 
employment, potentially contributing to an increase in income inequality and the unemployment rate. 
More recently, such tendencies have extended to some services, through the subcontracting or 
outsourcing of tasks such as accounting, statistical treatment, IT development and customer relations 
(call centres). Competition from emerging economies thus is now affecting skilled labour. We should 
also note that this extension of manufacturing and sub-contracting in the countries of the South is 
reinforced by competition between firms in the North and their frantic search for productivity gains, 
another aspect of globalisation. In any case, the result is that income distribution in the developed 
countries has had a tendency to distort in favour of those at the top of the income scale to the detriment 
of those in the middle and at the bottom. 
 
This increase in inequality (mainly in salaries) in favour of the most highly skilled has been reinforced 
by an increase in profits and return on capital - mostly held by those with the highest standards of 
living. The slowdown in wage growth for one part of the workforce has systematically contributed to 
swollen profits. In addition, the geographic redeployment of production has primarily followed an 
imperative to increase the profits of multinational corporations, clearly the initial inspiration for 
globalisation. It is scarcely surprising then that ultimately it has benefited their owners. 
 
Several other factors have contributed to the aggravation of inequalities inside developed countries. 
We cite three. First, rapid technological progress in the last few decades has allowed savings in low-
skilled labour, and increased demand for equipment and skilled labour in production activities. It has 
had similar effects to those created by the extension of trade on the relative costs of these factors. 
Second, the economies of scale permitted by technical progress have also concentrated the revenues of 
some activities in the hands of a small number of economic actors: think for instance of the growth in 
audiences for the stars of cinema, opera, rock music and sport, created by modern communication 
tools. The increase in the size of big companies that operate globally in turn also (partly) explains the 
growth in executive salary packages, in the same way as the growing size of financial portfolios 
explains the huge income and bonuses paid to fund managers and traders. Of course, this expansion in 
the scale of certain economic activity is not solely responsible for the stratospheric earnings of some 
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CEOs and stars. Indeed, it multiplies natural rents, like those stemming from the talent of artists or 
sportspeople, and artificial rents that come with all monopoly situations, collusion agreements and 
asymmetries in information like insider trading.  
 
Market liberalisation and deregulation constitute a second factor in the aggravation of developed 
world inequality. Initiated by the Reagan and Thatcher governments at the beginning of the 1980s, and 
progressively imitated around the developed world, some of the reforms have created monopoly rents 
where deregulation has not led to competition. The deregulation of financial markets that ended the 
separation of savings banks and investment banks gave the big banks considerable market power 
through their deposits, and blackmail potential in a crisis of being “too big to fail”. If we consider the 
reduction in the rate of unionisation as an endogenous deregulation of the labour market, then we have 
another example of the unequal effect of some deregulation. 
 
The third factor is taxes and the continual backing away from progressive taxation. On the grounds of 
economic efficiency and the international mobility of capital and its owners, top marginal tax rates 
have been drastically reduced in many countries. In the UK, the rate fell from 80 per cent to less than 
50 per cent in three decades. The decline was equally dramatic in the United States and even, to a 
lesser extent, in Sweden. Another reform adopted in several countries has been the decoupling of taxes 
on labour income and those on capital income, and a related international realignment, so that now the 
rate of tax on capital income is lower than that on work income. 
 
Are these three developments really independent of globalisation? Not necessarily. The aim of several 
of the reforms discussed above was to increase the competitiveness of the economies concerned, and 
we could argue that in a certain way they were also a response to the competition provoked by 
globalisation. Even technological progress, usually considered exogenous, occurs partly as a result of 
investments in R&D, which companies made in order to meet the challenge of competition. 
 
Some of these factors are also evident in developing economies, where we see an increase in 
inequalities, but some are specific to developed economies. At the beginning of the reforms launched 
by Deng Xiaoping, for example, China was a socialist country, comparable from the point of view of 
inequality to the economies of northern Europe. Liberalising the economy even partially meant 
liberating individual initiative and talent, and introducing differences hitherto stifled or erased by the 
socialist economic system. The same development could be seen in Vietnam and to a lesser extent in 
India. Yet, the fact that 30 years after the reforms, inequality in China is now greater than in all 
formerly socialist countries, including Russia, and is approaching the levels in Latin America, the 
most unequal in the world, suggests that other forces are at work. 
 
There are reasons to believe that at first, inequality grows with development. The population is 
initially concentrated in the subsistence sector or, in socialist economies, employed in state enterprises. 
Inequality is low. With development and liberalisation come opportunities for economic gain, which 
are grasped by a small group of individual entrepreneurs. Peasants migrate to the cities, which are 
industrialising, but competitive pressure from this quasi unlimited supply of workers restricts the 
growth of wages. The gains of development are thus monopolised by entrepreneurs, owners of capital 
and highly skilled workers in short supply. Inevitably, inequality grows, a process that is reinforced by 
new rent opportunities created by development and inadequately controlled for lack of appropriate 
governance.  
 
This process of development and growing inequality was described by Nobel prize-winning 
economists Simon Kuznets and Arthus Lewis over fifty years ago, but they also predicted that the 
phenomena would return, when the supply of reserve labour was exhausted, provoking an increase in 
wages and a reduction in profits. 
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China is close to, or has perhaps already, passed this stage. There is now a scarcity of labour and 
according to some, in the coming years we should see wages grow faster, inequality recede and the 
structure of the economy shift in favour of the most technologically advanced sectors. This stage 
seems more distant for the other emerging powers of Asia. 
 
Several factors could, however, thwart such a transformation. In the first place, Chinese leaders fear 
that the recent increase in inequality is poised to take social root in the next generation. Second, the 
global contagion of inflated incomes, thanks to the remarkable mobility of highly skilled labour that 
drives up the salaries of executive directors, bankers and their deputies in developing economies to the 
level of those in the rich countries, has spread around the world. Third, there is a fear that the 
explosion in inequality will create an elite that will progressively take control of the economy. In each 
of these scenarios, the example of Latin America, where such an elite often blocked development in 
order to enrich itself, is cause for concern. 
 
Yet, the reduction in inequality in Brazil, one of the most unequal countries in the world just a decade 
or so ago, presents a different example for consideration. The reduction is a result of a combination of 
factors, including an ambitious policy of redistribution, three decades of political education, 
accelerated growth and a demographic shift in low-income families. The distribution of living 
standards remains highly skewed, but the Brazilian example shows that emerging economies can 
influence the evolution of inequality without undermining their capacity to catch up with rich 
countries. 
 
Turning now to the future, what can we predict about the trend towards inequality in the world? And 
what means do we have at both international and national levels that might reduce or, conversely, 
reinforce that trend? 
 
Regarding inequality between countries of the world, there is good reason to believe that the historical 
process of equalisation of the past twenty years will continue, barring a major economic accident in 
the global economy or certain large national economies, such as a series of natural disasters that would 
drive the global community to decide to reduce CO2 emissions dramatically, a violent democratic 
transition in China that would paralyse the Chinese economy for some years, a major war or financial 
disaster arising from the bad management of the current European debt crisis. On the other hand, the 
emerging and developing economies have the capacity to grow even if stagnation or slow growth 
persists in the developed economies. Indeed, in the future, the largest ones will be able to rely on 
domestic markets of considerable size and, for the moment, largely under-developed, whereas all 
countries will benefit from a broadening and deepening of the present progress of South-South trade. 
  
Greater uncertainty surrounds the fate of Africa. Opinions differ as to the reasons for the increased 
growth in the last ten years (and for some countries, a little longer). Is it the result of better governance 
and more rigorous development policies and strategies? Or is it simply a consequence of the higher 
prices paid for raw materials, related to global growth, particularly in the emerging economies? The 
answer differs from country to country. If the second explanation is true for the majority of countries, 
then there is a risk that the slowing of global growth in coming years will affect development in poor 
countries and paralyse a powerful engine for reducing inequality in the world. It should be clear, 
moreover, that in the long term, an African development based chiefly on rents earned from raw 
material, mineral or agricultural, is not sufficient in the face of a population growth rate that will not 
slow down in the immediate future. It is likely then that African economic development is going to be 
a weak spot in inclusive global development, and that development assistance and other development-
friendly policies must be maintained, if not strengthened, so that the aim of reducing global inequality 
does not run into this obstacle. 
 
The direction of the trends relating to inequality inside national economies depends in the first place 
on policies put in place to contain or diminish it. We can, nevertheless, say that in the developed 
The Globalisation of Inequality 
5 
countries some of the forces behind its increase in the past few decades will remain in place. Indeed, is 
difficult to see a reduction in the intensity of global competition, especially with emerging economies 
booming. Under these conditions, the search for competitiveness, to minimise production costs 
through technological innovation, the increased concentration of the forces of production, and if we do 
not intervene decisively, the growing dominance of finance, will all apply upward pressure on 
inequality. These trends will not necessarily be affected by the slowdown in Western economies, 
which could, rather, exacerbate global competition. In emerging economies, on the contrary, we 
cannot preclude the possibility that reaching the Kuznets-Lewis rollover threshold will halt or even 
reverse the increase in basic inequalities and, moreover, that human capital accumulation strategies 
might also lead to some income equalisation. 
 
This vision of the trend in inequality inside nation-states does not take into account actions that 
governments could take to remedy existing inequalities or stop them from increasing. Three main 
types of intervention are possible: income redistribution through taxes and transfers of various kinds; 
the “redistribution of opportunity” to ensure a better allocation of human capital (that is, through 
education), greater access to services and facilities, including credit; and finally, the regulation of 
markets deemed important, such as the labour market and financial markets. 
 
Economic theory emphasises the costs of distortion that can follow the redistribution of current 
income by changing incentives relating to effort, savings and risk. For example, in a globalising world, 
greater mobility of people than of capital means that there are costs associated with national taxation 
regimes more severe than those in other countries. From this point of view, the scope of governments 
in developed countries to equalise incomes through a progressive income tax is not unlimited. 
However, the tax cuts implemented in some developed countries over the last 20 or 30 years suggest 
that a certain margin is still available. This seems a fortiori the case in emerging economies where 
progressive income taxation is still marginal, despite the growing potential for state control that is 
linked to the development of banking services. 
 
Distributing educational capital more equally, and facilitating access to the means for accumulating 
other productive assets (entrepreneurship, credit and the like), does not in principle involve the same 
costs. On the contrary, by allowing individuals to pursue their talent rather than be forced into jobs and 
skills they do not want, this kind of redistribution improves the efficiency of the economy while in the 
long term generating a more equal distribution of income. Though strictly speaking, such a strategy is 
not a direct response to the causes of rising inequality in recent years, it is still likely to erase some of 
its consequences. However, it requires initial financing by increased tax revenue and does not 
completely avoid distortion costs. 
 
Intervening directly in markets by regulating their operations can affect more directly the root causes 
of the recent rise in inequality. But again, we must avoid making inefficient markets. Regulating in 
order to restore effective competition and eliminate rent-seeking is obviously ideal insofar as it allows 
us at the same time to restore fairness and efficiency. As already noted, such opportunities are likely to 
exist in the financial sector. Regarding the labour market, the debate is not settled among economists 
about the negative effect of regulations such as a minimum wage, which undoubtedly helps to contain 
inequalities at the bottom of the wage distribution. It depends to a certain extent on the level at which 
the minimum wage is fixed. Other major interventions such as employment protection do, however, 
have negative effects on distribution ‒ by creating a dualism between “insiders” who are protected by 
the legislation and the “outsiders” who are exploited by temporary employers ‒ and on the 
employment rate. 
 
One type of intervention often discussed in developed economies in recent years consists of 
introducing a measure of protectionism in foreign trade, especially with those countries in which 
labour costs are very low. If it were possible, such a policy would likely contribute to an increase in 
salaries and in the employment of low-skilled workers, but at some considerable cost, starting with the 
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inevitable reduction in exports to those countries against which the protection measures are taken, and 
a drop in employment and wages in the corresponding sectors. There would be other equally damaging 
costs and obstacles. First, if protection is to be exercised against the emerging economies, it would 
have to be multilateral. And it is not certain that all the commercial partners in a free-trade zone – say, 
in the European Union – would agree on a list of products against which to protect themselves. 
Second, many products coming from the emerging economies are mass consumption goods – clothing, 
shoes, games, electronic goods and the like – which represent an important part of low-income 
households' budget. Such households might gain in employment and wages, but would lose on cost of 
living increases.  
 
It is not certain that the final real gains of protectionist policies would be positive because, third, the 
value chains that lead to end products today are long, complex and increasingly international. The 
example of an iPhone is well known: it combines essentially American innovation and distribution 
value with electronic content made in Asia. Protection against Asian production would thus make this 
kind of product more expensive and reduce sales. Fourth, to regain markets that have been practically 
abandoned, such as clothing, games and crockery, would demand tariffs so high that national 
consumers would be the losers. Protectionist measures would have to be concentrated where 
developed and emerging economies compete, in car production, pharmaceuticals and even aeronautics. 
But currently, these are also still largely export sectors in developed countries. The final point here 
then is that gains in productivity and competitiveness in a national economy are in part linked to its 
export and import activity. Protection against international competition in a range of products would 
result in an economy turned inwards, locked up and renouncing the benefits of innovations. 
 
In sum, the hypothesis that protectionist policies could correct the relative losses in income for low- 
and unskilled labour in some developed countries is not realistic because its costs could be exorbitant. 
There are other, much less expensive, ways to fight inequality, starting with taxation, education and 
training policies, and the regulation of certain sensitive sectors such as the finance sector. Let’s use 
them. 
 
In conclusion, the apocalyptic vision of a hyper-globalised world in which the differences in standards 
of living inside a country will be the same as those we see today between countries is fortunately not 
on its way. We have seen inequality rise in a majority of countries, especially in the developed world. 
But even in the countries where inequality has most increased (for example, in the United States), the 
difference between within-country inequality and global inequality remains, with few exceptions, 
abysmal. We have also seen that while the globalisation of trade, and the increased mobility of labour 
power and capital are partly responsible for the rise in inequality, they do not explain it entirely. This 
suggests that there is a separate factor in the trend towards inequality that is at least partly controllable 
by states.  
 
On the global level, the good news is the decrease in inequality thanks to the historical catch-up of the 
emerging economies of Eastern Europe, Asia, South America and Southern Africa. On the other hand, 
there is some fear that the poorest countries might still be lagging behind and risk undermining the 
process of lowering inequality on a global scale. Happily, the reduction of global inequality is high on 
the international agenda, as is evidenced by the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. 
 
In the developed countries, the means are available for reducing inequality, and redistribution is 
already taking place. The problem is that globalisation and international competition will encourage 
these countries to reduce redistribution ‒ and social protection more broadly ‒ on the grounds that they 
must defend their competitiveness and that social protection increases the cost of labour. This 
tendency can already be observed in several countries and it is not independent of the processes of 
globalisation. Similarly, we must acknowledge that in a globalised world, national fiscal autonomy is 
limited. Too great a hike in the marginal tax rate can result in flights of talent, capital and businesses 
to neighbouring countries. However, scope remains for state intervention in the field of taxation, and 
The Globalisation of Inequality 
7 
considerable progress is still to be made in a number of countries in relation to equal opportunity 
among citizens and the correction of market imperfections that simultaneously create both too much 
inequality and too many economic inefficiencies. 
 
The emerging economies constitute a separate case. Rising inequality in those countries persists, and 
their capacity to favour the redistribution of income, to create equal opportunities and promote good 
governance, is currently limited. It is to be hoped this capacity will grow with time and economic 
development itself. Here, the decrease in inequality in Brazil over the last six years is exemplary, even 
if there remains a long way to go before it reaches the global average. 
 
In sum, the question is essentially political: is there enough political will, in the countries where 
inequality has risen sharply, to act in order to reverse the trend? At the international level, while the 
will seems to exist to ensure that poor countries do not deviate from the global economic growth trend, 
we are apparently still far from such determination when it comes to tackling inequality inside 
countries and bringing into line, even roughly, taxation regimes. Ultimately, however, such 
harmonisation may be a necessary condition for the continued pursuit of globalisation and the 
preservation of its gains. 
 
 

  
 
